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FORDHAM UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
FORDHAM COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTE 
 
47TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL 
ANTITRUST LAW AND POLICY 
 
Day 3 — Friday, October 9, 2020 
 
Welcome 
 
James Keyte 
FCLI Director and Adjunct Professor of Law, Fordham Law School;  
Director of Global Development, The Brattle Group 
 
MR. KEYTE:  Good morning and good afternoon, 
depending on where you are, and welcome to day three 
of the Fordham Antitrust Conference.   
It has been an excellent two days so far 
with great economic workshops, a Heads of Authority 
Q&A, wonderful keynotes and discussion yesterday, a 
great tech panel, a mergers panel, and a very 
invigorating Fireside Chat with Barry Hawk and Bill 
Kovacic. 
In this age of pandemic, in some sense you 
get closer to the speakers.  It’s up-close, it’s not 
personal, but it is definitely a different experience 
and in some sense more connected.   
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Today will be equally substantive and 
interesting.  We have two fantastic keynotes from the 
Chairman of the FTC and the head of the U.K. 
Competition and Markets Authority; a Fireside Chat 
with Fred Jenny, head of the Competition Committee of 
the OECD among many, many other things; and Karen Lent 
will finish by moderating an in-house counsel panel 
with competition counsel leaders from Verizon, 
American Express, Walmart, and Google. 
I would like everybody to stay tuned for all 
of those. 
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Keynote Introductions 
 
MR. KEYTE:   Our keynotes are two of the 
most analytical and forward-looking enforcers that we 
have in our antitrust global community. 
Joe Simons is the FTC Chairman.  He has had 
an illustrious antitrust career.  He was the chief of 
the FTC’s Competition Bureau a while back, and there 
he was known as someone willing to litigate based on a 
first-principles assessment of the merits.  He was 
known as a very creative analytical thinker, 
responsible for developing the critical loss framework 
for market definition.  Even back then Joe was a 
person of practical action.   
He co-chaired Paul, Weiss’s Antitrust Group.  
I worked with him and against him a few times.  It was 
always a pleasure and I always had to be on my toes 
analytically. 
Since heading the FTC, Joe has brought that 
energy and analytical focus to the FTC across a number 
of industries — very forward-looking, very practical, 
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very evidence-based, whether he is looking at hospital 
mergers, pharma, IP, and now tech, which we have all 
talked about so much. 
Joe has also organized a great group of 
people around him both for analysis and investigations 
and also for going to court when they feel there is a 
basis for that, and you will always know that the FTC 
is looking at the interests of consumers but also 
looking at the effects on businesses and on 
understanding what businesses are up against on an ex 
ante basis. 
It will be great to hear from Chairman 
Simons. 
After Joe will be Andrea Coscelli, the Chief 
Executive of the CMA.  He happens to also have his PhD 
in Economics from Stanford.   
His leadership at the CMA has been highly 
visible, analytical, and very forward-looking.  
Whenever there is an industry or an analysis that is 
on the cutting edge of antitrust both jurisprudence 
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and economics, Andrea Coscelli is usually on that edge 
with the CMA. 
He takes a fresh look at markets using again 
a very analytical but practical approach, identifying 
problems, looking for solutions.  That is again in 
pharma, abusive pricing, financial services, and 
obviously also in tech.   
He has also been a great participant in the 
Fordham Conference in the past as well as over the 
last couple of days with our Heads of Authority Q&A 
Workshop, which was fantastic. 
Our questioning panel are also two leading 
lights in the antitrust field.   
Sharis Pozen is a forming Acting Assistant 
Attorney General at the DOJ and had a leadership role 
in the past at the FTC.  She was the Vice President of 
Global Competition Law and Policy at General Electric, 
she was a former Partner of mine actually at Skadden 
Arps, and now is the co-head of Clifford Chance’s 
global antitrust practice.  
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What I can say from having worked with 
Sharis and having seen Sharis in action in all of 
those different roles is that she has a great instinct 
for what is an antitrust risk and how to address it 
practically, and so she brings great perspective to 
this panel discussion. 
Finally, we have Antonio Bavasso, who co-
heads Allen & Overy’s global antitrust practice.  
Antonio has serious academic chops, a summa JD from 
the University of Florence, a PhD from the University 
of London.   
He is Co-Founder and Executive Director of 
the Jevons Institute for Competition Law and co-editor 
of Competition Policy International.   
His day job at Allen & Overy focuses on 
merger control, media, and abuse of dominance, 
particularly in media, broadcasting, and high tech.   
I understand he is also close friends with 
Andrea, but I don’t think there is any evidence of 
conspiracy that I have seen in terms of the panel 
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discussion today. 
We will get started.  I will fade away and 
bring in Chairman Simons. 
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Keynote Address1 
 
Joseph J. Simons 
Chairman, U.S. Federal Trade Commission 
 
 
MR. SIMONS:  Thank you, James, and good 
morning to everyone or good afternoon as the case may 
be.  Thank you to Fordham University for hosting this 
wonderful conference.  I also want to thank our 
moderators for putting this panel together, thank you 
to Sharis and to Antonio, and of course thanks to 
James for organizing the conference, especially under 
these less-than-ideal circumstances.  
It is unfortunate that we cannot see each 
other this year in person, but I clearly appreciate 
the opportunity to join you for what I have always 
found to be an absolutely outstanding program. 
After nearly two-and-a-half years or so as 
Chairman of the FTC, I marvel at how much has happened 
 
1 The published version of these remarks, including citations, is available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2020/10/prepared-remarks-chairman-joseph-simons-
fordham-universitys-47th. 
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over the course of my relatively brief tenure — some 
of it not so good.   
In late 2018 and early 2019, we faced a 
government shutdown that kept the Commission staff out 
of work for about a month.  This year, of course, we 
have had to deal with an unprecedented global pandemic 
and virtually 100 percent telework at the Commission. 
Yet, despite this adversity, the FTC has 
remained resilient and aggressive.  In fact, as an 
example, our Bureau of Competition has had a record-
setting year with more merger enforcement actions in 
Fiscal Year 2020, which just ended a few days ago, 
than any year since the year 2000.  Let me repeat 
that: We have had more merger enforcement actions in 
Fiscal Year 2020 than in the last twenty years.   
I am so grateful to our dedicated staff for 
the amazing work that they continue to do on behalf of 
American consumers, especially during these 
challenging times. 
One of the best parts for me of being at the 
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FTC has been the opportunity to work with our team of 
bright and dedicated economists in the Bureau of 
Economics, or BE as we call it.  BE provides 
tremendous value to our agency’s mission by supporting 
our case work and conducting independent research that 
sheds light on difficult competition questions.  
Needless to say, I strongly believe that economic 
analysis is a powerful tool for informing policymaking 
and I welcome efforts by economists at the FTC and 
outside the agency that help in that regard. 
Nevertheless, I think we have to be 
disciplined and careful in using economic studies for 
policymaking, especially when we consider major 
changes.   
Over the past few years, many critics have 
called for drastic changes in competition policy.  As 
support for their positions they have cited a variety 
of economic studies as allegedly justifying the need 
for such changes.   
But I have noticed three types of problems 
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with how economics have been deployed in efforts to 
justify these changes.  First, economic studies with 
methodological limitations have been used to support 
overly broad conclusions.  Second, economic studies 
have been cited to support propositions without 
accounting for more obvious alternative explanations.  
And third, new economic models or tools have been 
widely incorporated into everyday practice, perhaps 
without the sufficient rigor that we would really want 
to have.   
Although I am encouraged that people are 
looking to the best available research in support of 
their views, we need to be careful in how we use 
research to advocate for policy changes, particularly 
significant policy changes. 
Let’s start with the problem of drawing 
broad conclusions from studies with methodological 
limitations.   
As I said earlier, economics can be a 
powerful tool for studying competition policy 
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questions, but there can still be serious limitations 
in doing so, even after decades of advances.  Data may 
not be available to study a certain question.  The 
sample size might be too small.  There may not be an 
appropriate control group.  Even the most 
sophisticated techniques sometimes cannot overcome 
these limitations. 
For example, Professor John Kwoka prepared a 
monograph that conducted a meta-analysis of a whole 
set of merger retrospective studies to assess how well 
U.S. antitrust merger enforcement is working.  His 
study concluded that merger enforcement has been too 
narrowly focused, which has allowed price increases to 
occur following certain decisions not to block 
mergers.  Also, he found that merger remedies, 
particularly conduct remedies, were not adequately 
eliminating harm to competition. 
His monograph is an important contribution;  
let me make that clear.  These are the kinds of 
questions that we should be studying, and I am very 
 13 
 
 
 
 
thankful he has been seriously looking at these 
issues. 
But the study has its limits.  FTC 
economists Michael Vita and David Osinski raised some 
serious questions about Professor Kwoka’s study.   
They point out that some of the 
retrospective studies that he relies upon predate much 
of modern merger enforcement.  For instance, three of 
the analyzed mergers predate the issuance of the 1982 
Guidelines and one predates the enactment of the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Act back in the 1970s. 
Also, they note that the mergers that John 
studies are concentrated primarily in a few industries 
— petroleum, airlines, and academic journals — which 
limits the conclusions that can be drawn about the 
overall effectiveness of the merger enforcement 
programs at the FTC and DOJ.   
Also, in the portion of the study that 
considers the efficacy of merger remedies, the study 
is only able to use seven merger retrospectives to 
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estimate price effects after the merger, and one of 
those studies only relied upon data for the period 
prior to the remedy being imposed. 
Of course, that is not to say we should 
ignore Professor Kwoka’s work, but we also should not 
just rush to conclude that we need wholesale changes 
in our merger policy.  Instead, I think what we need 
to do is dedicate even more resources to studying some 
of the questions that his study leaves open. 
Professor Jon Baker recently published a 
book called The Antitrust Paradigm: Restoring a 
Competitive Economy.  In March of 2019, I gave the 
keynote address for the release of Jon’s book at a 
conference at American University.  At that event, I 
noted that Jon’s book represents a very significant 
contribution, and I stand by that assessment. 
But Jon appears to draw broader conclusions 
from some of the studies than I think are warranted.  
For instance, Jon cites a working paper that aims to 
estimate the empirical effects of the Supreme Court’s 
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decision in the Leegin case.  The Leegin decision 
reversed an old precedent that treated resale price 
maintenance (RPM) as per se unlawful, and instead the 
Leegin Court applied a rule of reason framework to 
those agreements going forward.   
Even though Leegin changed the treatment of 
RPM agreements under federal law, some states continue 
to prohibit RPM agreements per se under state law.  
The study compared the price and output effects in the 
states where RPM followed Leegin’s rule of reason 
analysis with the states that prohibited RPM 
agreements per se.  The study found that prices were 
higher and quantity was lower for some products in the 
Leegin states.  But the products experiencing a price 
increase were rarely the same products that 
experienced a decrease in quantity.  And where prices 
go up but the quantity does not decrease, the most 
likely explanation is an outward shift in the demand 
curve, which likely enhances consumer welfare. 
In addition, others have pointed out that 
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this study was not able to identify which firms 
actually imposed RPM agreements in the Leegin states.  
In fact, many of the products covered by the study, 
such as produce and everyday consumables, typically do 
not even use RPM agreements.  That makes it very hard 
to draw conclusions about the effects of RPM 
agreements from this particular study. 
Finally, a number of economists have 
published studies showing an increase in markups and 
citing that as evidence that market power is growing 
across the economy.  These studies all appear to show 
consistently increasing markups, though the magnitude 
of the effect varies significantly among these 
studies. 
Although the results initially may appear 
concerning, there are at least two methodological 
limitations to these studies.  
First, some studies rely on the North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes 
to study effects.  NAICS codes are industry 
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classifications that are simply too broad to be useful 
for analyzing anticompetitive conduct or mergers.   
Second, many of the markup studies rely on 
accounting profits, not economic profits.  But when we 
think about the increases in market power, we really 
need to focus on economic profits.  In evaluating 
these markup studies, we have to consider how these 
limitations affect the studies’ conclusions. 
Even after we account for methodological 
issues, we also need to think carefully about what 
conclusions to draw from studies.  A study may show an 
increase in markups, a decline in labor share, 
diminished startup activity, or a reduction in capital 
stock across the economy.  But before we link those 
studies to weak antitrust enforcement, we need to rule 
out other potentially more obvious explanations. 
First, many of these studies look at markets 
that are so broad as to be irrelevant for antitrust 
purposes. In addition, many of these studies consider 
changes in concentration that may be totally unrelated 
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to antitrust enforcement.  For instance, a study might 
find increasing concentration among hospitals in some 
geographic regions, but if it doesn’t account for 
hospital closures, then it may incorrectly attribute 
increasing concentration to weakened antitrust 
enforcement. 
Second, broader trends in the economy or 
society may provide better explanations.  For 
instance, changes in aggregate markups may reflect 
technological changes, globalization, the shift from 
manufacturing to services, and other broader 
macroeconomic trends that can lead to increased fixed 
costs and lower marginal costs. 
Indeed, a working paper from Harvard 
economists Anna Stansbury and Larry Summers estimates 
that a decline in the workers’ share of income can be 
accounted for entirely by a decline in unionization, 
cost-cutting pressures at firms brought on by activist 
investors, globalization, and technological changes, 
rather than a decline in competition. 
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Another example involves studies that link a 
decline in business startups to rising market power.  
But these studies do not rule out demographic changes 
as a cause, particularly in the U.S. economy where the 
population is aging.  Also, if it is true that bigger 
companies are making more fixed-cost than sunk-cost 
investments, then startups may face higher hurdles 
entering those markets, which of course would reduce 
the number of startups.   
Other factors may also be at play, such as 
an increase in regulatory burdens that 
disproportionately affects potential new entrants. 
In short, we need to consider carefully 
whether the broader effects that we are seeing in the 
marketplace are really linked to antitrust enforcement 
or whether other causes are at play.  If other 
explanations are more likely, the appropriate policy 
response is not to change antitrust.   
To make antitrust changes under such 
circumstances runs a two-pronged risk.  First, the so-
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called “fixes” to antitrust will not fix the problems 
people are worried about.  And second, a misguided 
focus on antitrust may prevent implementation of real 
fixes from areas other than antitrust. 
Last, I want to touch briefly with you on a 
topic that I have written about extensively:  the use 
of economic models in our enforcement work.   
One of the more difficult problems we are 
facing is bringing precision to antitrust analysis.  
Theoretical economic work can help, but we have to be 
careful not to rely too heavily on tools that have not 
been empirically tested or that have not demonstrated 
predictive accuracy. 
For example, I have raised questions about 
the use of generalized upward pricing pressure 
indices, merger simulations, and aggregate diversion 
critical loss analysis.  I am not going to go into 
those criticisms here, but I do want to encourage 
economists to evaluate how these approaches perform at 
making predictions.   
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If all we do is identify some mergers that 
we failed to challenge but that resulted in price 
increases, which is only half the story.  We will not 
be able to improve our analysis unless we understand 
why we were wrong — why did we miss those mergers that 
resulted in price increases?  That is something that 
we need to focus on as an antitrust community. 
In support of that specific goal and our 
broader interest in seeing how well antitrust merger 
policy is doing, we recently announced the launch of a 
more formalized and robust Merger Retrospectives 
Program at the FTC.  As a part of this program, we 
plan to allocate more staff time and resources to 
retrospective studies.   
We have launched a website devoted to 
highlighting retrospective studies that includes a 
searchable database to make it easier to find these 
studies. Our Bureau of Economics plans to organize and 
support sessions at a major industrial organization 
conference on merger retrospectives.  And every three 
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years, the FTC’s Annual Microeconomics Conference will 
include a session dedicated to retrospectives 
research.   
We will also explore initiatives to allow 
cooperation with outside academics.  I am really 
hopeful that will bear fruit. 
This program is something I am really 
excited about, and I am hoping it will inspire others 
to start programs of their own.  Unfortunately, we at 
the FTC really should be devoting even more resources 
to this effort, but we just do not have the money to 
do it right now. 
I am going to end my remarks today by 
reemphasizing the value that economics brings to 
antitrust.  I commend the economists for their work in 
developing new studies and new tools to identify and 
deal with important antitrust issues and concerns.  
But as policymakers, we have an obligation to 
carefully evaluate new work and not move away from a 
strong bipartisan approach to antitrust without making 
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sure that we are confident that that is the right 
thing to do. 
Thank you for your attention, and 
I will turn it over to Andrea now.  Thank 
you.
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Keynote Address 
 
Andrea Coscelli 
Chief Executive, U.K. Competition and Markets Authority 
 
MR. COSCELLI:  Thanks, Joe, and thanks, 
James, for organizing the event. 
Good morning and good afternoon to everyone.  
It is a pleasure to be with you.  Obviously, it would 
be better to be together in New York as in previous 
years, but I think we are making the best of the 
current situation. 
Today I plan to focus on the CMA’s work in 
relation to digital markets and, in particular, our 
emerging views in relation to the design of a new ex 
ante pro-competition approach to address some of the 
harms in digital markets that we see.  I will also say 
a few words about our existing work to deal with these 
problems. 
Why is competition in digital markets 
important now?  Obviously, no one could have 
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anticipated the situation many governments around the 
world now find themselves in as a result of the 
pandemic, and clearly economic recovery is dominating 
the agenda in most jurisdictions. 
Earlier this year, we published the findings 
and recommendations coming out of a year-long market 
study into online platforms and digital advertising.  
This piece of work considered how advertising revenue 
drives the business model of major platforms.   
Our work found that large multinational 
online platforms, such as Google and Facebook, now 
have a central role in the digital advertising 
ecosystem and have developed such unassailable market 
positions that rivals can no longer compete on equal 
terms. 
In particular, their large user base is a 
source of market power, leading to weak competition in 
search and social media.  This matters to consumers, 
who receive reduced innovation and choice but also 
will be paying higher prices for goods and services 
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when the producers pass the high costs of advertising 
on to consumers.  We found, for instance, that 
Google’s price is around 30–40 percent higher than 
Bing’s when comparing like-for-like search terms on 
desktop and mobile. 
We are also concerned that the largest 
platforms are increasingly acting as a brake on 
innovation, setting the terms of competition in a way 
that tips the balance in their own favor and 
undermining the business models of new entrants and 
potential challengers alike. 
Our key recommendation was that a new 
regulatory regime is required in the United Kingdom to 
ensure that these markets continue to deliver benefits 
to consumers, businesses, and the economy as a whole. 
For me, the case for regulation is clearly 
made.  We have firms with very substantial and 
enduring market power protected by strong network 
effects who are able to leverage into adjacent social 
network (DSN) markets and can engage in envelopment 
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strategies that further protect their core sources of 
market power.  These firms are active across many 
markets and in many cases also act as an important 
access point to customers, giving them a strategic 
position.  They can use this to exploit the many 
consumers and businesses who rely on them and act to 
exclude or quash innovative competitors. 
Existing tools, in our view, are clearly not 
sufficient to address these potential harms.  For me, 
regulation seems to be the absolute best way at this 
stage to ensure digital markets continue to thrive and 
deliver the wider benefits we value so highly.  
Structural solutions may be needed in some cases if 
regulation is not effective.2 
In the course of our work we heard from many 
companies who told us that the significant market 
power of some online platforms poses an existential 
threat to their businesses.  We believe that without 
reform existing market dynamics in these industries 
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will mean that the next great innovation cannot emerge 
to impact our lives in the way the previous advances 
in digital markets have done in the past. 
As the Furman Review in the United Kingdom 
had done previously, we recommended that within the 
new regime a Digital Markets Unit should be 
established with the ability to enforce a code of 
conduct to ensure that platforms with Strategic Market 
Status (SMS), like Google and Facebook, do not engage 
in exploitative or exclusionary practices or practices 
likely to reduce trust and transparency, and to impose 
fines if necessary.3 
This Digital Markets Unit would also have 
the ability to impose ‘pro-competition interventions’ 
to drive greater competition and innovation in digital 
advertising markets.  This includes requiring Google 
to open up its click and query data to rival search 
engines to allow them to improve their algorithms so 
 
2 Similar recommendations are included in the recent report by the US Judiciary Antitrust 
Subcommittee. 
3 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/unlocking-digital-competition-report-of-the-
digital-competition-expert-panel 
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they can properly compete.  This also includes 
requiring Facebook to increase its interoperability 
with competing social media platforms. 
The CMA is now building on these 
recommendations in its work leading a Digital Markets 
Taskforce that was commissioned by the U.K. government 
earlier this year, just before lockdown, to provide 
advice on digital regulation. 
Alongside the code of conduct and the pro-
competition interventions, as part of our advice we 
are also considering a third pillar which will form 
part of this new SMS regime, a parallel merger regime 
for acquisitions by companies with Strategic Market 
Status.  We are considering whether the evidence 
supports a policy justification for such a regime 
based on the particular features of digital markets 
that increase the risks of consumer harm arising from 
acquisitions by particularly powerful companies and a 
heightened risk of underenforcement.  In particular, 
we are analyzing the extent to which such concerns 
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cannot be fully addressed under our current merger 
regime. 
As I will mention later in the speech, the 
CMA’s approach to digital mergers has already evolved 
considerably.   
It is against this backdrop that we are 
considering the merits and characteristics of a 
special parallel regime.  Our current thinking is that 
any special regimen would have its own jurisdictional 
and substantive test.   
In relation to the jurisdictional test, in 
contrast with the U.K.’s standard voluntary merger 
regime, companies subject to this special regime could 
be required to notify all transactions to the CMA 
subject to certain limited exemptions. 
In relation to the substantive assessment, 
competition concerns could be assessed under the 
standard “substantial lessening of competition” test.  
However, the inherent uncertainty that often 
characterizes developments in these digital markets 
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combined with increased risks of consumer harm where 
the acquirer already has Strategic Market Status may 
justify the use of a more cautious standard of proof 
than the “balance of probabilities” threshold under 
the standard regime. 
So what about this new regulatory regime for 
digital markets looks like?  Our view is that this new 
regime does not mean that some of the existing 
fundamentals go out the window.  The framework for 
antitrust is grounded in economic analysis.  It is 
well established and well understood.  We believe that 
any new regime needs to be grounded in this framework. 
For example, the notion of market power and 
the potential for abuse of this must still squarely 
factor in our consideration of where and when 
intervention is necessary.   
Similarly, the existing case law around 
anticompetitive practices will still be important in 
guiding future considerations as to the effects of 
actions, such as self-preferencing, which we recognize 
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in some circumstances might have procompetitive 
benefits. 
But it does mean that we need to examine the 
accepted wisdom carefully and not be afraid to change 
course, do things differently, and try new approaches 
where necessary.   
For example, it means looking hard at 
procedures and ensuring that they strike the right 
balance between giving appropriate rights of defense 
to parties without being exploited as a tool to 
frustrate the investigations.   
Similarly, we need to ensure that we at the 
CMA act with appropriate evidence and due diligence 
but equally recognize the pace many of these markets 
move at. 
It also means looking hard at the skills and 
capability we need to appropriately monitor these 
markets, investing more in our ability to collect and 
interrogate data.  In the CMA this is an area we have 
already been investing heavily in through our Data, 
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Technology, and Analytics Unit, which specializes in 
data science, engineering, behavioral science, and 
data and technology insights.   
It means not being afraid to try using new 
tools and approaches.  Our work on open banking, for 
example, has demonstrated the potential that opening 
up access to data can have in driving innovation.  
Just last week we announced that users of products 
enabled by open banking top 2 million in the United 
Kingdom, demonstrating clear demand for these 
services, which have been enabled by this 
intervention.4 
Lastly, it means understanding that our work 
is likely to be far more wide-reaching than just 
competition.  Digital markets are increasingly 
interconnected.  Action in relation to competition 
will never just occur in a vacuum, but increasingly 
will have consequences for work in relation to 
privacy, online harms, intellectual property, and 
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consumer protection.  We need to work more closely 
than ever before with our partners in other agencies, 
both domestically and internationally, to tackle these 
problems together. 
What is the path to this new regime?  In the 
United Kingdom the path to establishing this new 
regulatory regime will likely still have some way to 
run beyond the delivery of advice to the government by 
the end of this year.  Clearly, we are keen to see 
progress in a timely manner and stand ready to assist 
in any way that we can. 
In the meantime, we are focused on using our 
existing powers to the maximum extent.   
Over the past few years, a large part of our 
consumer protection work has been focused on building 
trust in online markets.  For instance, we have 
examined the practices of the largest cloud storage 
providers, tackled unfair practices by online gambling 
firms, and gone after social media influencers who 
 
4 https://www.openbanking.org.uk/about-us/latest-news/real-demand-for-open-banking-as-user-
numbers-grow-to-more-than-two-million/ 
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have tried to conceal paid advertising. 
Competition/antitrust enforcement is another 
key part of our toolkit.  This is an area we expect to 
be increasingly active in over the coming years, 
particularly pending the new regulatory regime 
described above.   
When the United Kingdom was a Member of the 
European Union, many of the biggest digital 
enforcement cases were undertaken on our behalf by the 
European Commission.  From January the CMA will be 
able to start to investigate the conduct that most 
affects U.K. consumers and we are actively considering 
a number of potential enforcement cases in the digital 
sector.  Given the cross-border nature of these 
markets, we are looking forward to working in close 
collaboration with our international partners. 
I want to say a few words about digital 
mergers.  This is a key area of focus for us.   
We have been working hard to develop our 
substantive assessment in recent years in light of our 
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increased understanding of digital markets and the 
learnings from some recent expert reports — for 
instance, in our case the Lear Report on past digital 
mergers that we published last year.5 
Key elements of the development in our 
substantive assessment include: 
• An analysis of a broad range of theories 
of harm, including those related to the loss of 
innovation and access to data.  Examples include the 
PayPal/iZettle6 review last year and Google/Looker.7 
• Consideration of dynamic counterfactuals, 
such as development of new products or services — for 
instance, the Sabre/Farelogix8 review and 
Amazon/Deliveroo,9 which is a transaction we reviewed 
this year. 
• An analysis of the valuation model and 
rationale for the merger to gain insights into the 
 
5 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
803576/CMA_past_digital_mergers_GOV.UK_version.pdf 
6 https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/paypal-holdings-inc-izettle-ab-merger-inquiry 
7 https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/google-llc-looker-data-sciences-inc-merger-inquiry 
8 https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/google-llc-looker-data-sciences-inc-merger-inquiry 
9 https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/amazon-deliveroo-merger-inquiry 
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acquirer’s plans and expectations for the target — 
again, for instance, Sabre/Farelogix; Google/Looker; 
Visa/Plaid,10 which is a transaction we recently 
cleared and where we published a decision this week; 
and Salesforce/Tableau.11 
• An assessment of the impact of the merger 
on both sides of the market in digital platform 
mergers, taking account of the differences in 
customers’ options on each side of the market — for 
instance, the current investigation of the 
viagogo/StubHub12 transaction and investigation of 
Taboola/Outbrain,13 which is a merger that was 
abandoned a few months ago. 
• We are also continuing to monitor closely 
mergers in digital markets and to initiate 
investigations ourselves where appropriate when 
parties choose not to notify to us ahead of completion 
— for instance, our current investigation of the 
 
10 https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/visa-international-service-association-plaid-inc-merger-inquiry 
11 https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/salesforce-com-inc-tableau-software-inc-merger-inquiry 
12 https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/viagogo-stubhub-merger-inquiry 
13 https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/taboola-outbrain-merger-inquiry 
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acquisition of Giphy by Facebook. 
We are also making full use of our evidence-
gathering powers when assessing digital mergers.  
Internal documents are often a key source of evidence 
as historic evidence, such as market shares and 
switching data may be less informative of future 
competition in dynamic markets. 
The potential importance of internal 
documents was brought into stark relief, for instance, 
by the recent disclosure in the United States by the 
U.S. House Judiciary Antitrust Subcommittee of Mark 
Zuckerberg’s emails from 2012, which highlighted that 
neutralizing the competitive threat was a key driver 
for Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram.  Obviously, 
this is information that would have been relevant to 
our predecessor agency, the Office of Fair Trading, 
when looking at that transaction in 2012. 
Our document review capabilities have been 
significantly enhanced since then.  We may now require 
the production of a large volume of documents in 
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appropriate cases, even at Phase I.   
We are also increasingly considering making 
us of our compulsory information-gathering powers to 
hold witness interviews, like we did, for instance, in 
Amazon/Deliveroo.   
We are also carrying out a major update to 
our substantive Merger Assessment Guidelines to 
reflect our current approach to merger review.  These 
updates are broader than digital mergers, but digital 
markets are one of the most significant areas of 
development. 
Lastly and just to conclude, earlier on I 
mentioned the work of our Data, Technology, and 
Analytics team.  Compared to staff members we have 
traditionally hired, this team has markedly different 
qualifications.  We have a number of PhDs in applied 
mathematics and physics.  In our new Behavioral Hub, 
we have colleagues with a background in psychology as 
well as a range of other backgrounds.   
One area this team is increasingly focused 
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on is scrutinizing how digital businesses use 
algorithms and how this could negatively impact 
competition and consumers, something that we believe 
will become increasingly important with ever-
increasing availability of large data sets and, given 
cloud computing, the ever-increasing use of machine 
learning and artificial intelligence algorithms. 
We believe it is not acceptable for firms 
not to be able to explain to us the outputs of these 
algorithms.  We plan to publish a paper on potential 
harms arising from algorithms in the coming months, 
and we will invite collaboration with firms, 
researchers, and stakeholders on matters for 
authorities to investigate, mitigate, and remedy any 
harms.  As part of this work, we will be considering 
how requirements for auditability and explainability 
of algorithms might work in practice. 
This is what I wanted to say by way of 
introduction.  I am very happy to take any questions.  
Thank you. 
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Panel Discussion 
 
Antonio Bavasso 
Partner and co-head Antitrust, Allen & Overy LLP 
 
Sharis Pozen 
Partner, Clifford Chance LLP 
 
    
MS. POZEN:  Thank you both for such 
interesting remarks. 
Joe, I love your “mythbuster” on the 
economic reports.  We have been waiting for that for a 
long time in the United States for some of the 
criticisms that have come in as a result of those. 
For you, Andrea, it is very interesting to 
hear what you are doing in the United Kingdom with the 
CMA. 
We are going to start our Q&A.  I know we 
have over a hundred people on, so if you have 
questions for these great leaders, I hope you will put 
them forward, and Antonio and I will make sure that 
they are asked. 
I am going to start my questioning to you, 
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Joe, if that’s okay.  We have all seen the FTC v. 
AbbVie decision in the Third Circuit and some trimming 
of the sails on disgorgement, which was stunning, and 
we heard about regulatory issues that Andrea is 
considering in the United Kingdom.   
Are there needed legislative tools or 
reforms related to your disgorgement or other 
enforcement powers that you think are necessary right 
now in the United States? 
MR. SIMONS:  Thanks for that question, 
Sharis. 
The answer is yes, and let me give a little 
context on 13(b).14  That is the part of our statute 
that at least historically has given us the authority 
to get monetary relief.   
Section 13(b) is the part of our statute 
that courts have interpreted gives us the ability to 
go get injunctions.  And courts for decades have 
interpreted that to include not only an injunction in 
 
14 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). 
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the regular sense you would think about it, but also 
the ability to get equitable monetary relief.  I 
forget the number, but seven or so appellate courts 
have been, for decades, saying that we have that 
authority. 
But over the last year or so, two circuit 
courts have said that we do not have that authority.  
One of those cases is now pending before the Supreme 
Court.15  This impacts a very, very significant part of 
what we do at the FTC both on the consumer protection 
side and on the competition side. 
On the consumer protection side, our anti-
fraud program relies heavily on this type of relief.  
We are able to go into court and get interim relief 
right away that freezes the assets of fraudsters.  It 
preserves those assets and prevents them from getting 
dissipated during the trial, and if we win at the 
trial, we have the ability to provide restitution or 
consumer redress.   
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This also was at play in one of the biggest 
cases we have ever had at the FTC, which was an $11 
billion settlement involving Volkswagen and its clean 
diesel technology.16 
Then, on the competition side, you mentioned 
AbbVie.  We had a victory at the district court level 
in which the court awarded us $448 million that we 
would apply for consumer redress, and the circuit 
court has now reversed that.17 
So, at least in the Third and Seventh 
Circuits so far, we do not have that authority 
anymore.  This is very problematic for us, and we have 
asked for Congress’s help.  We would like Congress to 
effectively clarify that the interpretations that were 
extant for thirty years by every circuit court that 
considered this issue really is the law and make sure 
we do not lose this important ability to get monetary 
relief. 
 
15 AMG Capital Mgmt. LLC v. FTC, No. 19-508.  The Supreme Court has consolidated AMG with 
the FTC’s appeal of the adverse ruling from the Seventh Circuit in FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, 
LLC, 937 F.3d 764 (7th Cir. 2019). 
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Then you asked about digital markets and 
legislation there.  Andrea has discussed a whole bunch 
of potential legislative types of activities relating 
to these digital markets.   
Some people in the United States, and other 
places as well, are thinking about digital platforms 
like public utilities and that they should be 
regulated as such.  Andrea was discussing this just 
before. 
There is in fact some precedent under 
antitrust law to do that.  I can think of two examples 
off the top of my head: one is the breakup of AT&T via 
the consent decree with the Justice Department;18 and 
the other also involved a DOJ consent decree with the 
two main performing rights organizations, BMI and 
ASCAP.19  Both of these examples were predicated on 
antitrust violations that then resulted in these 
 
16 https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/06/volkswagen-spend-147-billion-settle-
allegations-cheating. 
17 FTC v. AbbVie, Inc., No. 18-2621 slip op. (3d Cir. Sept. 30, 2020). 
18 United States v. AT&T, Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982). 
19 United States v. ASCAP, 41 Civ. 1395 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2001), 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/second-amended-final-judgment; United States v. BMI, 
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consent decrees with these public utility-like aspects 
to them.   
These decrees require judges to act 
effectively like public utility commissions by setting 
prices and other terms of service and conditions for 
access.  But clearly, these were not ideal 
circumstances.  The courts are not really structured 
to do this kind of work.  They do not have a team of 
economists and lawyers working for them to think about 
what the right pricing is, what the right terms and 
conditions are, and how access should be allowed or 
not. 
On the other hand, industry regulators, like 
real public utility commissions, do have the 
infrastructure to handle that kind of a job and they 
are set up specifically to do that.  Unfortunately, 
nothing is ideal, and at least the history in the 
United States is that entities like that, particularly 
at the federal level, are subject to political 
 
64 Civ. 3787 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1994), https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/bmi-final-
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influence and regulatory capture. 
There is a really interesting book called 
Misregulating Television: Network Dominance and the 
FCC that describes what the problems have been 
historically in the United States in terms of how 
television was regulated.20   
What they illustrate is that oftentimes what 
happens is the regulating body turns out to entrench 
the entity that it is regulating and actually reduce 
competition.  A good example of this is when cable 
television first came into being, the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) prohibited it except 
where there were no over-the-air broadcast signals 
that could be received from the broadcasters.  Rather 
than allow the cable companies to compete with 
television in their main places where they were an 
oligopoly, the FCC prohibited that.   
So, at least in the United States, history 
shows that such regulators often entrench the entity 
 
judgment. 
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they are regulating and they often can reduce 
competition and squelch innovation. 
This approach sounds really good in 
practice, but the execution is often very difficult, 
and before you do something like that you want to be 
really careful and thoughtful about it, which I am 
sure the folks in the United Kingdom are. 
I will leave it at that. 
MR. BAVASSO:  If I understood Chairman 
Simons’s comments correctly, he was pleading for a 
note of caution about the use of studies and 
retrospectives, although they clearly have a role also 
in his view given the plans that they have to 
strengthen them.   
I was wondering, Andrea, if you could offer 
us your perspective of how useful they have been.  
There has been a number of them that you have 
mentioned — the retrospective on Facebook/Instagram, 
the Furman Report, your market study.  How useful do 
 
20 STANLEY M. BESEN, THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER, A. RICHARD METZGER, JR., JOHN R. 
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you find these studies and retrospectives in guiding 
enforcement and policymaking; and have we had enough 
in the digital sector or do we expect more in the 
months to come? 
MR. COSCELLI:  Thanks, Antonio. 
I am probably in a very similar place to 
Joe, in the sense that I think both the FTC and we 
believe that retrospective studies are useful.  The 
question is, who does them and how?   
It seems to me there is a bit of a division 
of labor between an academic debate on retrospectives, 
which I think is helpful.  Obviously, a number of very 
competent people spent a lot of time thinking about 
the methodologies and some of the discussions that Joe 
referred to, but also I think there is a role for the 
agencies because sometimes we have better data and 
also we understand probably better some of our own 
processes than external academics.   
The decision we have taken in the CMA was 
essentially to do some studies ourselves, or 
 
WOODBURY, MISREGULATING TELEVISION: NETWORK DOMINANCE AND THE FCC (1984). 
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commission some studies, as a complement to the 
academic debate. 
We have done two studies.  One I mentioned 
briefly was about digital mergers, which we 
commissioned through a consulting firm called Lear.   
Another one was an interesting study that we 
did a few years ago looking at a subset of mergers 
that were cleared on the basis of entry and expansion 
arguments made by the merging parties, which seemed 
credible to us at the time.  We went back and looked 
at eight of these cases just to track what actually 
happened in terms of the entry and expansion of 
rivals, and we found a fairly mixed picture.  In 
around half of these mergers what happened was much 
more limited than what we expected to happen, which 
obviously had a negative impact on the competitive 
pressures in those markets, which we thought was quite 
relevant. 
The final point — is that we use our markets 
powers that most other agencies don’t have, to look at 
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the way competition works today in particular markets. 
We collect routinely lots of complaints about markets 
that are not operating particularly well, and use this 
to decide when to do particular studies in particular 
markets.  Very often those markets are markets that 
are quite concentrated and where essentially you can 
go back and look at previous transactions as 
potentially a source of some of the problems we find 
now. 
So it is not a particularly scientific 
exercise, but it is certainly very informative to try 
to think about the impact of mergers after a number of 
years. 
MR. BAVASSO:  Of course, as you said, you 
carried out an authoritative and very detailed and 
excellent market study on digital advertising, which 
has been followed closely in the United Kingdom and 
worldwide. 
I am intrigued and I want to ask another 
question related to that.  Obviously, if you cross the 
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Channel and look at what the European Commission is 
thinking in terms of equipping itself with new 
regulatory tools, one of the ideas that seems to be 
emerging is that they are looking — and I heard 
Commission Vestager mention that yesterday on the 
panel that she joined — at an idea very similar to the 
power that you already have, the power to start 
aftermarket studies and market investigations. That 
gives fairly uniquely to the U.K. CMA the ability to 
impose wide-ranging remedies even in the absence of a 
breach of an antitrust rule. 
In relation to digital advertising, you 
carried out that study.  You concluded that the test 
was met, but, interestingly, you declined to use the 
powers that the Commission now thinks it wants to 
equip itself with.   
Can you perhaps expand on your thinking as 
to why you opted to recommend a regulatory reform, as 
you just told us, as we heard, and what are the 
downsides if you were to advise Commissioner Vestager 
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of having those powers that you in this instance 
declined to use? 
MR. COSCELLI:  Linking a bit to what Joe was 
just saying, if you think about the mandate you have 
as an antitrust agency or the mandate you have as a 
regulator, the markets regime is a bit of a halfway 
house.  I think the intent of the British Parliament 
in creating this regime was to essentially allow the 
competition authority to be sort of a one-off 
regulator in some areas. 
Our practice is that there are some examples 
where this can be quite successful — so, for instance, 
the idea that post-privatization all the airports in 
London and Scotland were owned by the same entity; and 
following this process this market investigation 
reference our predecessor decided to break up the 
entity and create competition among the airports.  I 
think anyone who has used the London airports over the 
last ten years will have seen the benefits of that. 
Our assessment is that for something that is 
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complicated, like the digital advertising ecosystem, 
and where in a sense regulation or intervention 
probably needs to be targeted and then you need 
monitoring and you needed tweaking just to be 
effective, we felt this one-off process was probably 
not perfect, and we thought that the problems were so 
systemic that probably there should be a regulatory 
mandate — the way we regulate wholesale financial 
markets or energy markets or telecoms — obviously, 
bearing in mind the risks with regulation as well. 
That is our current view.  The U.K. 
Parliament will have to decide over the next months 
whether they agree with that and whether they are 
going to create this mandate, but we have made very 
clear that if this is not going to happen — either 
because the government is unconvinced or because of 
Brexit or Covid-19 or for whatever reasons — we are 
certainly going to come back and do what we think then 
is right using our current powers. 
MS. POZEN:  Great. 
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Antonio, I just want to note that we have 
gotten a couple of questions in.  Folks should 
continue to ask their questions.  We will hold those 
to the end because I think you and I have a little 
back-and-forth to continue.   
I am going to turn my question now to Joe 
Simons.  Joe, I think I came into the FTC just as you 
were leaving the first time.  You have been to the FTC 
now three times — Randy Tritell corrected me before — 
first in the Bureau Director’s office as a staff 
lawyer, then also in the Bureau Director’s office, and 
now as Chairman. 
Let’s turn to enforcement and the 
enforcement record.  What have you seen? What is 
different?  What do you think now, as Chairman of the 
Federal Trade Commission, and what do you think about 
your enforcement record? 
MR. SIMONS:  Let me cover that on a couple 
of different levels. 
First of all, the current level.  If you had 
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told me two years ago that we could handle 100 percent 
teleworking, I would have been very, very skeptical.  
The Commission was back then known for having a kind 
of rickety email system and IT infrastructure.  But we 
have two things going for us.  
First, we recently modernized our IT 
infrastructure by moving much of it to the cloud and 
making our systems much more scalable. 
Second, our staff is spectacular, incredibly 
qualified, and dedicated to our mission.  They were 
good when I was at the agency the last time, but now 
they are even better.  We are operating at an 
incredibly high level and maintaining very good morale 
under these challenging circumstances. 
In spite of the circumstances, what we are 
doing is unprecedented in terms of the level of 
enforcement activity at the FTC.   
For example, we have had twenty-eight merger 
enforcement actions this past fiscal year, which is 
Fiscal Year 2020 which just ended on September 30.  
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That is more than any year in the last twenty years.  
Just think about that.  We are going through a 
pandemic, our folks are almost 100 percent 
teleworking, and that they are able to function at 
this level is just mindboggling.   
We have had two federal court trials since 
July.  That is a lot for any year, and in this 
circumstance it is just incredible.  We also have two 
other merger cases in administrative trials that are 
ongoing. 
And the thing that is really remarkable is 
that our pipeline is still incredibly full, so we 
expect this huge number of enforcement actions to keep 
coming, at least through the next six months.   
So we are firing on all cylinders, and it is 
just a great thing to watch from my vantage point.  
It’s just incredible.  I cannot say enough about our 
staff. 
MR. BAVASSO:  Andrea, can I take a slightly 
different tack but still related to the abuses that 
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are relevant to the digital sector?  What is your view 
and experience about the pursuit of allegations of 
exploitative abuses?  The CMA has pursued some of 
those in the pharma sector.  Do you see that 
continuing beyond the pharma sector, or is it your 
view that this is all too difficult and should be 
primarily left to regulation? 
MR. COSCELLI:  We have a couple of 
standalone excessive pricing investigations in the 
pharma sector.  Obviously, the legislation allows for 
pure exploitative abuses.  These two cases, I want to 
make very clear, are very extreme in terms of fact 
patterns and in many ways I think could be described 
as very aggressive exploitation of regulatory 
loopholes. 
The first case has now gone through 
litigation.  We had a difficult judgment coming out of 
the lower court here, the Specialist Tribunal, which 
we decided to challenge, and we went to the Court of 
Appeal.  We now have a very clear legal framework 
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coming out of the Court of Appeal that makes sense in 
economic terms, it is perfectly consistent, but it 
sets a very high bar for intervention.   
The current cases we have are very extreme 
in terms of facts, so we are comfortable with what we 
are doing, but I think the clear consequence of that 
judgment from the Court of Appeal is that the ability 
of the competition authority in the United Kingdom to 
do standalone excessive pricing cases would be limited 
to pretty extreme cases in terms of facts. 
So I think the answer is no, that we are 
unlikely to have many more cases like this one.  There 
might be areas where our view would be that we would 
be advocating for either regulation or changes in 
existing regulation, if we find outcomes that we think 
are problematic. 
MS. POZEN:  There is a question that has 
come in from Nikita Shaw.  If you click on Q&A, you 
can see it.  I will read it out in case people don’t 
see it.  It has to do with algorithmic collusion, 
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which I think many of us have seen presentations 
about.  It is an interesting area to address if you 
are ready, willing, and able. 
The question is: “How are we going to 
address algorithm collusion where the collusion has 
been brought about by a hub without an actual 
agreement or any information to the spokes?  For 
instance, two developers develop software which could 
do a first-degree price discrimination by recognizing 
a reservation price of the consumers and charging them 
accordingly, and eventually all softwares start 
speaking within themselves without a company that 
adopts them having any role in it.  Alternatively, the 
public-distancing approach adopted in Eturas has more 
false negatives than false positives.  How will the 
U.S. antitrust authorities respond to such an 
approach?” 
I don’t know, Joe, if you want to talk about 
algorithmic collusion and if you have any thoughts 
about that or are thinking on it. 
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MR. SIMONS:  Sure.  I am always fond of 
saying that there is nothing new under the sun.  
Anytime someone comes up with something that is going 
on today in the digital world or whatever that seems 
highly unusual, I am usually able to find some kind of 
analogy back to the past, and I think there is one 
here. 
In the early 1980s, the FTC brought a case 
against a series of companies that made what was back 
then called anti-knock compound.21  If you are old 
enough to remember this, there were automobiles that 
if you were using low-level fuel, your engine would 
knock, literally it would make noises, and so they 
developed this additive that stopped the knocking.  
There were four companies that did this.  Two of them 
were much larger and they were very oligopolistic. 
The FTC saw that one of the things that they 
were doing was they all adopted most-favored-nation 
(MFN) clauses of one type or another, and the FTC 
 
21 E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984) (vacating Commission 
decision dated Mar. 22, 1983). 
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found that what those clauses were doing was 
facilitating collusion.  These are called facilitating 
practices. 
The FTC pursued the case in a very novel 
way, like a standalone Section 5 claim, and they did 
not bother to try to make the argument that the 
vertical contracts with the MFNs in them were 
agreements under Section 1.  They went purely under 
Section 5 standalone and did not go under Section 1. I 
think today, if we were to see something like this, we 
could go under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and 
actually attack this kind of thing. 
This is similar to these algorithms.  They 
are potentially facilitating price fixing or tacit 
collusion, and if that is what we saw was going on, 
that is something I think we could reach under the 
Sherman Act. 
MS. POZEN:  Andrea, I don’t know if you have 
views, if you have thought about these algorithmic 
collusion cases. 
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MR. COSCELLI:  We have a bit.  I think our 
view is that we want to understand the facts because 
it is clearly quite case-specific.  We will then hope 
that under our current legislation there is a way for 
us to address these problems if we believe that these 
are problematic; and, if we do not, then that is 
clearly another area where probably we would do some 
advocacy and talk to government and think about 
potential gaps in the current legislation. 
MR. SIMONS:  I think that is a big issue for 
us too.  With the Ethyl case I was describing, you 
could have had an agreement and brought that under 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, but in the algorithmic 
collusion that is the subject of the question it is 
unclear whether you would have something like that at 
play and whether you would have a gap, in which case 
maybe that is something that Section 5 of the FTC Act 
could handle. 
MS. POZEN:  Antonio, back to you. 
MR. BAVASSO:  I had another question for 
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Andrea stemming from his remarks earlier about what to 
do on digital mergers.   
You referred to the fact that you are 
thinking about introducing something or the 
appropriateness of introducing something that falls 
short of the balance of probabilities.   
I noticed that the Antitrust Subcommittee 
that published their report earlier this week 
suggested that the U.S. Congress consider something 
very extreme, which is essentially introducing a 
presumption for a future acquisition by a dominant 
platform whereby they need to show that any 
acquisition would be presumed anticompetitive unless 
the merging parties confirmed that the transaction was 
necessary to serve the public interest and similar 
benefits cannot be achieved.  This is a very extreme 
presumption that they advocate Congress consider.  At 
the other end, there is the status quo. 
I infer that you are thinking somewhere in 
the middle.  We know that the Furman Report talked 
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about the introduction of an alternative test based on 
a balance of harm.  Do you have any emerging thinking 
that you can share with us as to what type of test 
could be applied in these types of circumstance and 
which companies would be caught? 
MR. COSCELLI:  We have been a bit on a 
journey in this area.  One key point for us is 
obviously of the 400-odd acquisitions by Google, 
Facebook, Amazon, and Apple.  There has never been a 
prohibition, which from where we stand today does not 
quite seem right with the benefit of hindsight.  So 
the question is, where did we go wrong; where was the 
problem? 
As you know, over the last two or three 
years we have devoted quite a lot of resources in 
looking at a number of these mergers.  We have ended 
up interfering with literally just a few of those, and 
some of those have been abandoned.   
But one of them, the Sabre/Farelogix case, 
which quite interestingly we looked at in parallel 
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with the Department of Justice, we prohibited, and we 
are now being challenged and we are going to be in 
court next month in the United Kingdom.  Obviously, as 
people here know, the Department of Justice also 
challenged this in the United States but was 
unsuccessful. 
This is a useful data point for us because 
again we need to understand to what extent our courts 
are comfortable with substantive concerns about 
dynamic competition, innovation, things that 
personally as an economist I am very comfortable with, 
but obviously you need to reflect this in the case 
law. 
At the end of the day, we need the right 
outcomes.  We are certainly not on a crusade here to 
spend a lot of time just looking at acquisitions by 
these particular platforms or certainly not to end up 
in an area where essentially you block everything that 
these companies are doing. 
The question is:  What is the landing zone?  
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Jason Furman and the other academics looked at the 
test of balance of probabilities.  We are looking at 
standard of review.  For instance, we have a standard 
of review at Phase I, which is a reasonable prospect, 
of “substantial lessening of competition.”  Should 
that be the right test at Phase II for acquisitions by 
this handful of platforms that have significant market 
power? 
These are the current questions we have and 
we will be talking to government about.  But, as I 
said, it is very much in parallel to the actual work 
that is going on every week in terms of looking at 
digital mergers and understanding a bit more about the 
analysis and the issues.   
For instance, Facebook is taking us to court 
now on interim enforcement orders, and again we are in 
court next week on that.  That is a challenge on 
procedure, but it has a big impact in terms of our 
ability to deal with completed mergers. 
So there are a number of things happening 
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now in parallel discussions that are going to 
influence I think where we land in terms of our own 
advice, and then obviously it will be for Parliament 
to decide whether anything is changed in terms of 
legislation. 
MS. POZEN:  Antonio, can I follow up on that 
with Andrea? 
We sit across the Atlantic and we watch the 
CMA.  I have heard you have enhanced your staffing.  I 
think if you took Joe’s Bureau of Competition and the 
DOJ lawyers together, they are roughly equal at the 
CMA.  I don’t know if that is fair.  I think we are 
seeing a lot of assertive, aggressive — whatever word 
what we want to say — enforcement out of the CMA. 
Again, I have had a lot of American clients 
say, “Do you have somebody on your team who can talk 
to us about the CMA?”  And likely we do. 
I would love to understand, if you can share 
with us, your enforcement philosophy.  I know 
consumers obviously have to be your North Star — that 
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is the North Star of the U.S. agencies as well — but 
how else would you describe your enforcement 
philosophy?  I think people would love to hear that. 
MR. COSCELLI:  It is very much focused on 
consumer outcomes, very much focused on continuous 
learning.  We were talking about retrospectives 
earlier today.  I think this is really important for 
us.   
Also, I think we want to be very much part 
of the intellectual international debate.  Obviously, 
there is an academic debate.  There is a political 
debate obviously in the United States and obviously 
around Europe. 
I think some of the remarks Joe made early 
on about some of these discussions about outcomes — 
whether there has been underenforcement, concentration 
markups — this is quite important for us.  Personally, 
my current reading of the debate is that there has 
been a degree of merger underenforcement over the 
years by everyone, so we are trying to correct that. 
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I have some lawyers comparing us in terms of 
deal mortality with some other agencies, but when I 
look at some of the deals that are failing in front of 
us, these are three-to-two horizontal mergers with 
massive barriers to entry.  So you really wonder about 
the risk assessment going on in some boardrooms today.  
Also, as you know and we know, there is 
quite a lot of shopping around in terms of advice as 
well of people who really believe that certain 
transactions have to happen and are essential, so 
maybe they then go with their third set of lawyers 
after the first couple of sets have expressed some 
concerns. 
I think there is a general discussion going 
on where a number of people think that there should be 
very, very limited constraints on a lot of merger and 
acquisition activity, and that is probably not where 
we are, so we think it is actually quite important to 
try to prevent some of these issues from arising. 
As I say, I think this market regime is 
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quite useful because I literally receive every day a 
number of letters from members of Parliament or 
associations complaining about poor outcomes in 
particular sectors.  In a number of these sectors, 
quite honestly, if you go back to the last five or ten 
years, there have been one or two transactions that 
have potentially caused some of the issues we have.  I 
think we are trying to learn from that. 
MR. BAVASSO:  Andrea, we can’t let you go 
without talking about Brexit.  Very generally, two 
things in relation to that are: What do you expect the 
role of the CMA to be post-Brexit; do you see it as 
increasing its influence and ability to go its own 
way? 
A related question to this in terms of the 
impact on the U.K. regime: Do you think that the 
voluntary regime in the United Kingdom for merger 
notification is sustainable after Brexit, or do you 
see that requiring an adjustment to the prevailing 
mandatory regime that applies everywhere else? 
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MR. COSCELLI:  I will start from the latter 
question.   
For instance, this case in court next week 
on Facebook/Giphy is a useful one to understand 
whether the regime can actually sustain the current 
situation. 
We have a voluntary regime.  The quid pro 
quo is essentially that we have powers to stop 
integration because obviously otherwise if we end up 
blocking a merger, it is not obvious what the remedy 
would be.   
If a company is involved and the courts 
think that we need to spend a lot of time on this 
enforcement order, it essentially becomes impossible 
for us to administer the regime as is.  So I think we 
will be very vocal in asking for a mandatory 
notification regime like everyone else. 
In terms of Brexit, I think our ambition is 
very much to be at the top table discussing 
international mergers with our counterparts.  Over the 
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last two or three years, most of our big merger 
inquiries have been in parallel either with the FTC or 
the DOJ — obviously not with the European Commission 
because of the way things have worked so far — and 
also with some of the other national competition 
authorities.  Obviously, the European Commission will 
become a very active partner for us in terms of 
parallel investigations. 
Again being very open, there is a question 
for us in terms of added value and resources about 
truly global mergers.  I will give you an example.  At 
the moment, the London Stock Exchange is buying 
Refinitiv.  It is a big transaction in Europe and 
obviously it is a big transaction for the United 
Kingdom.  So you can imagine in the post-Brexit world 
next year us spending quite a lot of time in parallel 
with the European Commission looking at that 
particular transaction. 
What we are less clear about internally are 
truly global transactions.  If you think about 
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Bayer/Monsanto, what is the role for the CMA on 
something like that?  I think that is something we 
need to see in terms of the way it will play out. 
There is also again a question for us but 
also for the courts about the evidence and, in a 
sense, the U.K. process in terms of the evidence in 
litigation in the context of very international and 
parallel merger reviews.  Again, that will settle and 
sort itself out somehow over the next few years. 
But I think there is definitely going to be 
a significant discontinuity for us between the current 
situation and the situation in a few months’ time.  We 
have had plenty of time to think about it and to 
prepare for it, so hopefully we will manage it well. 
MS. POZEN:  Shifting back over to Joe, can 
you talk to us a little bit about the Vertical Merger 
Guidelines?  I know it was an achievement to have both 
DOJ and the FTC sign on, although I will note the vote 
on that.  Talk to us about what you think that is 
going to do, how it is going to help, what we should 
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take from the Vertical Guidelines. 
MR. SIMONS:  Originally, I was not that 
focused on drafting Vertical Merger Guidelines.22  But 
then what happened was the AT&T/Time Warner case23 
changed that outlook for me.   
I was taken aback to see that some people 
were suggesting that the federal government does not 
do vertical merger enforcement, effectively saying or 
implying that vertical mergers are per se legal. 
I was really taken aback by that, and I 
thought to myself: Gee, if serious people think that, 
then we really have to disabuse them of that, and 
maybe the best way to do that is to revise the 
Vertical Merger Guidelines.   
For us they were not really a revision.  We 
didn’t have any Vertical Merger Guidelines; it was 
just the DOJ Guidelines from more than thirty years 
ago. 
 
22 Vertical Merger Guidelines, 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1580003/vertical_merger_guidelin
es_6-30-20.pdf. 
23 United States v. AT&T, Inc., No. 18-5214 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
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I wanted to make clear to people that, 
“Yeah, maybe vertical mergers are not as problematic 
as horizontal ones on average, but that does not mean 
you shouldn’t have vertical merger enforcement.” 
Anticompetitive vertical mergers are not 
unicorns.  We challenged a few of them when I was the 
Bureau Director, almost twenty years ago, and we have 
had some since I have been back, and I would not be 
surprised if we have more coming in the near future as 
well.   
We really wanted to make sure that people 
knew that we were alive and well on vertical merger 
enforcement and that this is something we are 
absolutely looking at and, if we see a problem, we 
will act. 
I think the other thing too is that there 
has been a huge amount of literature on vertical 
mergers that has developed since the DOJ Guidelines 
back in the 1980s.   
People like Sharis and Antonio, who are 
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heavily involved with the antitrust community and 
leaders in the field, probably knew how the agencies 
would approach vertical merger enforcement, but for 
the broader antitrust community, I think that was 
really pretty opaque.   
I think some of the broader community really 
had the view that, Oh, this is not something we need 
to worry about.  That is one of the primary reasons we 
needed to change that. 
MR. BAVASSO:  Can I ask a question to both 
of you?  It is a broad question, but I am interested 
in your take.  There is an increasingly vibrant debate 
about the impact of sustainability questions in 
antitrust enforcement that go beyond traditional 
considerations.  Do you see these types of 
considerations having a real impact on antitrust 
enforcement; and, if so, how? 
MR. COSCELLI:  I can be very brief.  This is 
obviously something we are thinking about.  In Europe, 
I think the European Commission and the Dutch 
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Competition Authority have been in the lead 
intellectually in this space.  Particularly the Dutch 
Competition Authority has had some specific cases 
where they came under quite strong criticism for some 
of the positions they took. 
Our current position at the moment is that 
we are spending quite a lot of time looking into it.  
We have not received direct approaches from companies 
that have complained to us of not being able to do 
certain things because of competition law.  Our door 
is certainly open if you want to come.  Obviously, 
lots of people self-assess and get advice. 
For instance, one of the things we are 
planning to do now is to talk to some nongovernmental 
organizations active in this field that may not have 
access to legal advice in the same way as large 
corporations to see whether they think there are some 
constraints in terms of some of the things they think 
should happen. 
Obviously, the main player in a lot of these 
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issues is the government rather than a competition 
authority, but at the same time it seems quite useful 
to all of us if competition authorities are helpful in 
these areas as opposed to potentially being an 
obstacle to some of these initiatives. 
MR. SIMONS:  Antonio, it was not clear to me 
what your question was.  Did you say “sustainability?”  
I’m not sure what that means. 
MS. POZEN:  In the United States, Antonio, 
wouldn’t we call it in economic terms externalities; 
to what degree should we take into account 
externalities like sustainability or jobs? 
MR. BAVASSO:  Yes, sustainability or jobs or 
environmental considerations.  I do not know to what 
extent that is an active debate in the United States, 
but it is certainly an increasingly active debate on 
this side of the Atlantic. 
MR. SIMONS:  There is certainly an active 
debate in terms of what should the goals of the 
antitrust laws be, what is the first principle.   
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I think it is safe to say in the courts the 
first principle is consumer welfare, although I would 
interpret that term very broadly to include not only 
price but quality and innovation for sure. 
There is a debate with respect to things 
like inequality and workers’ income share and things 
like that, but I think, at least under the existing 
case law, that it would be very hard to cover that.  
Also I think it presents some real, serious 
problems.  When you have a first principle like 
consumer welfare, which is very consistent within 
itself and drives the analysis, and it gives you a 
basis on which to balance procompetitive and 
anticompetitive effects. 
If you are talking about things like worry 
about jobs and income share and inequality, then you 
seem to have to have tradeoffs: “Okay, this merger may 
result in lower prices for consumers, but it may also 
cause fewer jobs.”  How do we balance those things 
out?   
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My own sense is that those types of other 
considerations are best dealt with outside of an 
antitrust framework and that we should deal with them 
through direct means rather than using antitrust, 
which is a very indirect tool to deal with those. 
MR. BAVASSO:  That, of course, was one of 
the most powerful intellectual arguments — 
particularly in the United States, where the role of 
the court is so important — to construe consumer 
protection narrowly.   
I think we have a very different perception 
here because a court would have great difficulties 
presumably to balance off heterogeneous considerations 
of that type, an area that a competition authority 
would be more comfortable with. 
MS. POZEN:  Antonio, I see that we have 
gotten a clarification question for the CMA about the 
LSE/Refinitiv.  I will read for the audience who do 
not have access:   
“A clarification question for the CMA: Would 
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the LSE/Refinitiv deal be reviewable by the CMA if the 
European Commission is already in the final stages of 
their review of the transaction?  Your previous 
comment seemed to imply that they would review it next 
year alongside the European Commission, though the 
deal is expected to close by early next year.  More 
broadly, if two merging companies have formally made 
their EC filing prior to year-end, could a merger be 
subject to CMA review?  Thank you.” 
MR. COSCELLI:  My fault.  I was not being 
clear. 
The LSE/Refinitiv deal is in Brussels and 
will finish its review in Brussels and the CMA is not 
involved with it, although we are involved as a Member 
State. 
When I mentioned next year, I just meant a 
transaction like LSE/Refinitiv taking place next year 
would be reviewed in parallel by us and the European 
Commission.  But this particular transaction I am 
using as an example will have nothing to do with the 
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CMA.  It is being reviewed by the European Commission, 
and that review will finish in the next few months, 
and that will be the end of it. 
MR. BAVASSO:  The Withdrawal Agreement is 
very clear:  Jurisdiction is determined at the time of 
notification. 
MR. COSCELLI:  Basically everything that is 
filed in Brussels before Christmas stays in Brussels 
with some technical referral things we are not going 
to get into now.  But if the filing does not occur 
this calendar year, from the first of January we will 
have jurisdiction on turnover and share supply. 
MS. POZEN:  Well, it looks like we have one 
more minute.  You have both mentioned international 
cooperation and cooperation between your agencies and 
others.  Is there anything you want to add that our 
audience — we have about 119 people — might be 
interested in? 
MR. SIMONS:  My impression is that the 
pandemic is having almost no effect.  The overwhelming 
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majority of the work, at least in our international 
group, is done on the telephone anyway and in 
videoconferences, so that is clearly not being 
affected. 
It is actually quite interesting.  You miss 
the personal interaction.  I think if this were to go 
on for a long period of time, it would be detrimental 
to international cooperation because I think what 
happens is that over a period of time, people see each 
other and they know each other and they feel 
comfortable with each other.  And so it is much easier 
to do things over the phone once you have that kind of 
base already established.  At least that’s my view. 
For now it is working very well.  If this 
were to be a long-term thing, then it might become 
more problematic. 
MR. COSCELLI:  Yes, very much the same.  I 
just want to make a couple of extra points.   
I think on merger control there is a lot of 
international cooperation that has been very effective 
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over the years at the case team level literally week 
by week. 
What is interesting, obviously, at the 
moment is the attempt to coordinate antitrust 
activities or market studies in areas like digital 
platforms, which we have discussed today.  If you 
think about all of the work going on vis-à-vis Google 
or Facebook, it is the first time probably in history 
that so many agencies are dealing with very similar 
problems, not on the merger side but on the conduct 
side, and I think there is a very significant effort 
by all involved to coordinate.  It is just more 
difficult because people are using sometimes different 
tools and national legislation is somehow different.   
So if we end up with a world of remedies, a 
lot of work will be needed to try to coordinate, to 
make sure that this patchwork of remedies will make 
sense from a business point of view and from a 
consumer’s point of view. 
MS. POZEN:  Inn the United States we have 
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the State Attorneys General as well, as Joe knows only 
too well. 
Antonio, back to you to close us out. 
MR. BAVASSO:  I think it’s a wrap as they 
say.   
I just want to thank Chairman Simon and 
Andrea Coscelli for their availability. It has been 
fascinating to get direct insight from both of them.  
Thank you for your comments and your candor.  I am 
sure our audience has benefited a lot from getting 
this perspective directly from you. 
MR. SIMONS:  Thank you for a great panel. 
MR. COSCELLI:  Thanks, everyone. 
MS. POZEN:  Thank you, and we pass it back 
to James. 
MR. KEYTE:  Thank you very much.  Thank you, 
Joe, Andrea, Sharis, and Antonio.   
What a wonderful panel.  What a wonderful 
discussion.  These are very dynamic times for 
antitrust and for debating these policy and 
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enforcement issues.   
I also really do enjoy this format where we 
have more Q&A with the keynote speakers, so we 
certainly will do that in future events including, 
presumably, a live event next year. 
We would like all of you now to join us and 
your colleagues for a Fireside Chat with Fred Jenny.  
It is going to be fascinating.  He is another icon in 
our industry.  It will be a lot of fun.  We will be 
doing that in this Remo technology, where you can also 
interact with your colleagues and friends. 
Let’s all transition over to Remo, and then 
after that we will have our in-house counsel panel 
that Karen Lent will lead, which should be a very 
interesting conversation. 
I will see you all in a few minutes.  Thank 
you very much. 
